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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that a monetary union requires a banking union. While the 
USA developed both during a time span of two centuries, the EMU was 
created in the course of two decades and remains unfinished as the economic 
pillar is largely missing. The financial crisis and the Eurocrisis have shown 
that a genuine banking union is even more needed for the Eurozone than a 
budget or a fiscal union to let the euro survive. 
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1   A Eurozone without a Banking Union   
The economies of a well-functioning Monetary Union benefit from a single interest rate, 
reflecting the monetary policy stance of their common central bank. During the first phase of the 
EMU, this was also the case in the Eurozone, leading to booming economies in the whole 
Eurozone but even more in the periphery (the VEAPs or "Vulnerable Euro-Area Peripheral  
Countries" including the so-called GIPSI-countries, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, 
plus Cyprus and Slovenia).  
 
Shortly after the financial crisis, in 2009-2010, investors started adopting a different view on the 
fiscal and competitiveness position of each member of the currency union. They realised that the 
VEAPs suffered from weaker economic fundamentals than most of the Northern member states, 
problems that could not be compensated anymore by currency depreciations and higher inflation 
rates. An important variable was also the solvency situation of the governments, itself related to 
the solvency of domestic banks.  
 
The dangerous embrace of banks and sovereigns in the Eurozone is the result of the fact that 
banks hold a large amount of domestic government debt on their books. Total sovereign bond 
holdings at the books of banks amounted to around 1200 billion euro at the end of 2007 and 
increased to 1720 billion euro of government securities mid 2013 (around 18% of the Eurozone 
GDP). This was even more the case in the Southern members. Their exposure on debt of their 
own sovereigns increased from 16 to 22% in Italy, from 26 to 33% in Spain, from 10 to 25% in 
Ireland and from 14 to 18% in Greece (even taking into account the debt restructuring of Greek 
sovereign debt in 2011). Banks in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland now hold more than 700 
billion of domestic sovereign debt on their books while in 2007 it was around half that amount. 
The reasons for “home bias” (the fact that banks hold a disproportionate share of debt of their 
own sovereign) are several. First is the “moral suasion” by national regulators; it is in the self-
interest of banks to make domestic government financing more dependent on domestic banks, so 
as to have another argument to force the government to rescue domestic banks in case of banking 
problems. Another argument is “carry trades”, where banks are betting long on high-risk 
sovereign debt, a phenomenon seemingly more prevalent in the Southern member states. 
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Funding such exposures was also made possible by the ample liquidity provided by the ECB via 
the three years Long Term Refinancing Operations, which started at the end of 2012. Additional 
factors that could have amplified the home bias approach were recommendations from core 
country supervisors to domestic banks, demanding risk reduction of their sovereign portfolios. 
And finally there is the systemic risk of an extreme scenario of a Eurozone break-up, when 
liabilities of banks would be re-denominated into local currency and so would the domestic 
sovereign debt, hence domestic banks would be better prepared for redenomination of domestic 
sovereign debt than foreign banks. Battistini, Pagano and Simonelli (2013) confirm that “moral 
suasion” and “carry trade” trade hypothesis are particularly valid for peripheral countries’ banks, 
whereas systemic risk scenario of the euro break-up forces all banks to “turn back home” and 
even more those in core countries. 
Ideally, a bank should be able to go bankrupt, as any private company. However, if a bank faces 
difficulties, it is hard for a government to let that private institution fail. This is even more valid 
for large banks (and 85% of all assets in the Eurozone are held by some 130 banking groups). If 
one of these large banks goes bankrupt, a significant share of families lose their savings; this is 
something politically hard to accept and disastrous for the economy as the loss in wealth would 
shock demand in the country and bring down growth. All banks are interrelated and one bank 
going broke brings down other banks, which have them lend money via the interbank market or 
other channels. This is the problem of “too big to fail”. In the absence of a European fiscal 
backstop (something we argue for in this paper) only national governments can rescue their 
banks. It sets therefore in motion a "vicious circle" or "doomed loop" between banks and 
sovereigns: weak banks are more likely to add to the public debt problems and countries with a 
high or even unsustainable public debt are considered too weak to back their banks, leading to 
weak banks that are distrusted by other banks and loose access to cheap funding via the interbank 
market. The result is that markets start to link the fate of governments to the solvency of the 
banking system and the other way round. At least, that is the case in the Eurozone; in the USA 
there exists no such relationship. This is illustrated in Figure 1 where the credit default swap 
(CDS) premia on sovereign and bank debt is correlated.  
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Figure 1 - Relationship between solvency of banks and sovereigns in the EZ and the US 
  
Source: Datastream 
Note: Daily observations since end 2010. 
        
This is due to the fact that: i) banks hold a smaller part of total US sovereign debt, which is 
mostly in the hands of foreigners and non-bank financial institutions ii) the USD, as the first 
international reserve currency, enjoys a special investment status and iii) to the fact that 
Eurozone banks rely more on volatile wholesale funding while US banks are more funded via 
equity and customers deposits (IMF, October 2013). However, the main reason is probably the 
existence of a fiscal backstop in the USA that helps the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) to resolve smaller banks in a credible way via its 100 bn USD credit line to the Treasury. 
TARP (or Troubled Asset Relief Program of original 700 bn USD, later reduced to 431 bn USD) 
can be considered as an ad hoc fiscal backstop to rescue or resolve systemic banks. 
 
The doomed loop between banks and sovereigns increases the costs of credits for business and 
households in the Southern member states leading to less investment. The fact that the 
economies of the eurozone are financed for around three quarters via banks (less than one fifth in 
the USA) increases the impact of this problem for investment and demand. 
 
Table 1 illustrates that Vulnerable Euro Area Periphery Countries (VEAPs) grew faster than the 
Euro-area and even significantly faster than the North/core, prior to the outburst of the eurocrisis. 
During the period 2010-2014, the sudden capital withdrawal and the austerity measures needed 
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to readjust their economies led to a negative growth rate (except for Ireland) and a skyrocketing 
unemployment rate. 
 
Table 1 -  Fragmentation of Economic Performance in the Eurozone 
 
 
Annual GDP change Unemployment rate 
1999-2009 2010-14 1999-2009 2010-14 
Euro area 1,5% 0,7% 8,7% 11,1% 
North1 1,4% 1,4% 6.7% 6.9% 
VEAPs2 1,7% -0,6% 7.5% 15.0% 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO  
Note: Data for years 2013 and 2014 are estimates. 
 1 Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 
2 VEAPs=Vulnerable Euro Area Peripheral Countries: Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. 
 
The Eurocrisis revealed the fundamental problem of the “vicious circle” or “doomed loop” 
between sovereigns and banks. It was reflected in the report “Towards a genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union”, prepared in 2012 by the Four Presidents (of the Council, the Commission, the 
Eurogroup and the ECB), who proposed the creation of an “integrated financial framework” or 
“banking union” as one of the four building blocks of a complete EMU. The report stresses the 
need to "break the link between banks and sovereigns".  
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2    Theoretical foundations of a Banking Union 
The Theory of Optimal Currency Areas (OCA) states that a monetary union will only survive if 
the benefits of more economic integration due to adopting a common currency exceed the 
disadvantages caused by the loss of the exchange rate instrument. If this condition is not met and 
an economy is hit by an asymmetric shock, sufficient flexibility in factor markets can solve the 
problem. Flexibility should pertain to two aspects: across the board mobility and flexible prices.   
 
Labour mobility is close to nil between North and South and very low between West and East of 
the EU. Cross border mobility within EU15 in 2010 stood at just 0.35 %, which compares to 
interstate/province mobility in the US, Australia and Canada of 2.4, 1.5 and 1 %, respectively 
(OECD, 2012). Labour markets in the EU are much more regulated and wages display 
downward rigidity, while cultural/language differences also inhibit migration.  
 
Figure 2 - Labour market protection in the eurozone and other EU member states 
                      Protection of permanent workers 
             against individual and collective dismissals                                      Regulation on temporary contracts 
 
Source: OECD 
Note: The indicators of Employment Protection are compiled by the OECD, for more 
information on the methodology refer to www.oecd.org/employment/protection. 
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Concerning the factor capital, before the eurocrisis, cross border capital mobility was high, as a 
result of the single financial market after the introduction of the euro. However, due to the 
eurocrisis, banks withdrew behind national borders and this condition for a successful monetary 
union (cross-border free flows of capital) is now much weaker than before. This is in itself a 
strong reason for a Banking Union. 
 
Figure 3 – Conditions for an Optimal Currency Area 
 
 
If an economy is adversely hit by a shock and the labour markets cannot absorb that shock, a 
monetary union is still viable, the OCA concludes, if there is sufficient solidarity and shock 
absorbing capacity at the federal level. The EU budget amounts to 1% of the total GDP 
generated by the EU countries, only about half of which can be considered as fiscal transfers 
from richer to poorer Member States. The larger share of these transfers are of a structural nature 
and do not serve as shock absorbers. Moreover, the EU Treaty includes two "no bailout" clauses, 
meaning that fiscal transfers are limited to the EU budget or separate intergovernmental 
arrangements, the European rescue funds: the temporary European Financial Stability 
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Mechanism (EFSM) - based on the EU budget and amounting to 60 bn euro borrowing and 
lending capacity, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), ad hoc institution with a 
borrowing and lending capacity of 440 bn euro and the permanent European Stability mechanism 
(ESM). Currently, these instruments consist of additional funds which, amounting to more than 
5% of EU-27 GDP, that can be used to help mitigate imbalances within the EMU and support 
structural change. These funds can be deployed only in programme countries and have to be 
repaid, so they cannot serve as automatic stabilizers and shock absorbers for the whole EMU but 
are rather financial assistance instruments, which are used in times of real hardship. They include 
an element of solidarity because all Eurozone sovereigns that back the rescue funds accept risks 
rejected by private financial markets. Proposals of a Eurozone budget that would play a 
stabilizing function (cf. Trésor, 2013 and Wolff, 2012, National Bank of Belgium, 2014, 
Geeroms, Ide and Naert, 2014) meet fierce rejection by important member states such as 
Germany and other Nordic member states, mainly net-payers to the EU budget. The condition for 
accepting these proposals is the establishment of a political union, something that is also rejected 
by most countries. The chances to move closer to a political union are even more remote after the 
May 2014 elections for the European Parliament, whereby Europe critical parties represent a 
larger number of MEPs.  
It is interesting to note that the traditional 1960s OCA theory does not provide any theoretical 
foundation for a banking union. This could probably be explained by the capital restrictions 
prevailing in those years; the dramatic surge in international capital flows was only triggered by 
the oil shock in 1973-1974, the growth of the Eurodollar market and the remarkable increase in 
bank lending during 1979-1981 (Kaminsky, 2005). The OCA theory was developed well before 
that period and could not draw lessons from sudden reversals of capital flows that caused a Latin 
American debt crisis (early 1980’s), a Scandinavian debt crisis (early 1990’s), a South-east Asian 
debt crisis (1997-1998) and a Russian debt crisis (1998). The theory was also developed by 
international economists who may have been less focused on financial theory (Maes, 2002). 
 
We can explain the role of a Banking Union in the framework of the OCA-theory in two ways: 
1) the absence of a Banking Union can be a reason for important asymmetric shocks due to 
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sudden capital flow reversals, or alternatively, 2) a well-functioning Banking Union can be an 
important instrument to accommodate such shocks.  
 
In line with the (graphical) framework elaborated by Mongelli (2013) we can illustrate the 
impact of the Eurocrisis and of creating a banking union as follows.  
 
Figure 4 - The OCA equilibrium: impact of the euro crisis 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Geeroms, Ide and Naert (2014) 
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the Eurocrisis has led to increased heterogeneity in the euro area, 
including a diverging business cycle and unilateral adjustment in the indebted member states, 
causing a drop in the correlation of incomes. The degree of openness, in particular in terms of 
financial integration, has decreased (see above). All in all, the euro area shifted from EMU' (pre-
crisis) to EMU" (after-crisis), whereby some argued that for instance Greece would better leave 
the Eurozone as it felt below the  OCA-line. 
 
On the other hand, the banking union has the unique feature of increasing private and public risk-
sharing. A full banking union will first of all increase financial integration by harmonising 
regulation (single rulebook, single supervisory mechanism, resolution plans, etc.) stimulating 
private financial flows and private risk sharing (depending on the nature of the financial flows) 
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and increasing the correlation of income and/or the degree of openness. This causes a shift from 
EMU’’ to EMU’’’. (see Figure 5). At the same time, a Banking Union includes an element of 
public risk sharing via the Single Resolution Fund of the SRM and the direct bank recap (see 
below). This shifts the OCA line downwards to OCA line’. In other words, the banking union 
improves the functioning of the EMU according to the OCA theory in two ways.  
 
Figure 5 - The post-crisis OCA equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Geeroms, Ide and Naert (2014) 
 
 
 
2.1    Destabilising capital flows in the absence of a Banking union as the main 
reason for the Eurocrisis. 
 
The volume of capital flows grew steadily from the mid 1990s to 2000 but then took a dip during 
the 2001-2002 recession, before a near tripling in flows between 2002 and 2007. At the peak, 
gross capital flows exceeded 40 percent of the Eurozone GDP, far in excess of other advanced 
economies.  
Openness 
benefits of 
common currency 
dominate 
OCA line 
benefits of 
monetary 
independence 
dominate 
EMU 
post-crisis increased 
flexibility 
OCA line’ 
EMU’’’ 
EMU" 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n 
of
 In
co
m
es
 
 12 
 
The common shock absorbers, i.e. flexible labour and goods markets, can never be sufficient to 
compensate for shocks of the magnitude caused by the vast volumes of capital flows that have 
amplified the existing imbalances. The Euro area countries exchange goods and services 
equivalent to around 20% of euro area GDP per year, compared with 15% in 1999 (ECB, 2013). 
The pre-crisis volume of capital flows within the Euro area was twice as much as the volume of 
intra Eurozone trade. 
Paul De Grauwe (2011) outlined why the capital flow reversal provoked such an important 
asymmetric shock in the Eurozone. He proves that a member state, for the very fact of  joining 
the EZ and giving up the control of its own currency and monetary policy, becomes more 
vulnerable to capital flow reversals and speculation against its sovereign debt compared to 
countries that keep their currency. A country that maintains control over its monetary policy can 
still monetise its sovereign debt or its central bank can allow higher inflation to erode the 
domestic debt. Even more important is the fact that capital outflows in such a country lead to a 
currency depreciation which, if not followed by an increase in exports, can only be reinvested in 
the same economy. In this sense, De Grauwe explains why American and British sovereign debt 
was not attacked by the markets - although these countries have weaker economic fundamentals 
than the Eurozone. The sovereign debt of several VEAPs was suddenly dumped in early 2010, 
but in their case, the capital outflow was in euro, a currency shared with other countries that 
benefitted from capital inflows, the mirror of the outflow from the VEAPs. Greece, Portugal and 
Ireland did not benefit from a drop in their currency nor had they the possibility to allow a higher 
inflation rate. The results are well-known and have already been outlined above: they became 
disconnected from the financial markets and needed support from the other eurozone members. 
One can add that a currency zone like the EMU offers more protection against such sudden 
capital reversals compared to a system of fixed exchange rates. Indeed, the Target2 system 
compensates the domestic banking sector from the weaker countries at least partially from 
deposit and funding withdrawal via the possibility to build up debts Target2 balances. It helps to 
smoothen the financial system but this is not a structural solution that helps economies re-gain 
their strength. 
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2.2   A Banking Union is needed in a monetary union 
Mundell himself (1973) added a new OCA property after developing his original approach of the 
early sixties. He showed that a common currency could better mitigate adverse shocks by reserve 
pooling and portfolio diversification. He argued that countries suffering from asymmetric shocks 
could still share a common currency while missing labour flexibility and a solidarity mechanism, 
if they can “insure” each other through financial markets. Financial integration permits to 
cushion asymmetric shocks through capital flows: deficit countries can borrow from surplus 
countries or can sell foreign assets if needed to finance their current account deficit. Under a 
common currency, a country suffering an adverse shock can better share the loss with a trading 
partner because both countries hold claims on each other’s output and “insure” one another 
through private financial markets.   
 
Figure 6  -  Share of MFI cross-border holdings of debt securities issued by euro area  
and EU corporates and sovereigns (percentages) 
 
 
Source: ECB 
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Figure 6 illustrates that until around 2005, financial integration in the Eurozone increased (for 
corporate bonds even until 2008) but this tendency was reversed since then and banking sectors 
started to withdrew behind national borders (see also Valiante, 2014), thereby making the EMU 
more vulnerable to shocks. The same tendency is observed for investment funds’ holdings of 
debt securities and equity (ECB, financial integration indicators). The collapse in capital flows in 
2008-2009 was truly remarkable, falling to about 5 percent of GDP; global capital flows are now 
one third of the pre-crisis level (Lane, 2013).  
In a well-functioning single market capital flows should lead to equalisation of the marginal 
product of capital across member states and that would be the only determinant of capital flows; 
thus domestic saving rates would be uncorrelated with domestic investment rates. Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) observed that this is not the case in the world, due to differences in taxation and 
regulations, besides other reasons. We observe that since the eurocrisis, the fragmentation of the 
EU's single market and the eurozone became very prevalent. 
 
Figure 7 - Collapse of financial integration since financial crisis (Correlation between savings and 
investment in the member states of the Eurozone) 
 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO 
Note: The higher the correlation, the lower the financial integration and risk sharing 
between member states. 
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One of the reasons is probably that banks are still very much "national banks" in the EU (see 
Figure 8), supervised by national prudential regulators that impose rules on their banks resulting in 
restrictions on international capital flows.  
 
Figure 8 - Foreign ownership of banks (number of foreign owned banks as percentage of total banks 
and assets of foreign owned banks as percentage of the total assets of the banking system) 
 
Source: ECB 
 
Banks in the EU remain to a large extent national, if we look at the relevant parameters "number 
of foreign owned banks" and "assets owned by foreign banks". The “nationalisation” of banks is 
more outspoken for the bigger member states, France, Germany, Spain and Italy (and the 
Netherlands) than for the smaller member states. The smaller member states have much more 
foreign banking activities and this is even more outspoken for the central European countries. It is 
therefore no surprise that France, Germany and Italy are among the most reluctant in transferring 
the responsibility for banking resolution to the EU level. 
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The policy reforms should aim at a new financial environment with less destabilising capital 
flows (such as excessive debt flows intermediated by non-diversified local banks) and increased 
stabilising capital flows (such as equity flows and debt flows inter-mediated through diversified 
banks that are embedded in an area-wide banking union). (Lane 2013)  
 
A monetary union therefore needs a single financial market and a Banking Union. Schoenmaker 
(2013) reformulates this conclusion in the form of an “impossible trinity” of simultaneously 
having integrated banking markets, national supervision and financial stability. This impossible 
trinity can logically only be overcome in one of two ways: either, one returns to a world of 
segmented national banking markets and forgoes the benefits of integration, or one moves 
towards supra-national structures for financial supervision and resolution. It is estimated that 
capital markets integration in the USA explains the absorption of two-thirds of shocks in the 
USA (Sørensen and Yosha, 1996). Gros (2012) illustrates, comparing the US State of Nevada 
with Ireland, that a banking union is more important as shock absorber than a fiscal union.  
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3     The EU and the Eurozone’s Banking Union 
The Report of the Four Presidents “Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union” (EU, 
2012) rightly suggests that the EMU requires an integrated financial framework or a Banking 
Union built on three pillars: a single supervisory mechanism, a single resolution mechanism and 
a single deposit guarantee scheme. President Van Rompuy also adds that there is a crucial need 
for a Single Rule Book and for an harmonised application of EU rules.  
This paper will not elaborate further on the key features of a fully-fledged banking union. The 
authors have argued elsewhere (Geeroms and Karbownik, 2014) what are the desired 
characteristics for a well-functioning banking union. At this moment (June 2014) a true Banking 
Union is not yet in place, even though it is addressed as such. 
 
3.1  The Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Comprehensive Assessment 
 
The first pillar, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), started functioning at the beginning 
of 2014, when the Supervisory Board met for the first time.  
The ECB/SSM cannot afford to become responsible for banks that can fail because they have 
hidden losses on their books; this could destroy the credibility of the ECB and of its monetary 
policy. For this reason, the SSM regulation includes the provision that the ECB must conduct a 
comprehensive assessment (CA); this CA is crucial and includes: 
1) a Risk Assessment exercise: an examination of all types of risk related to funding and 
liquidity, management, business models and so on (this less known aspect of the CA started third 
quarter of 2013);  
2) a Balance Sheet Assessment (BSA) which includes an assessment of the balance sheets and of 
a risk based selection of credit and market portfolios; it includes an Asset Quality Review (AQR) 
that is scheduled for the first half of 2014, based on the annual financial statements for the year 
2013; 
3) a stress test using the output of the BSA to be jointly conducted by the EBA and the 
ECB/SSM. This test will make a dynamic diagnosis for three years ahead. 
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The AQR and the stress test will lead to one single figure on the capital needs of each bank. 
Banks will need to have at least 8% CET1 (7% of CRDIV plus 1% because it concerns systemic 
institutions). Under the severe scenario of the stress test, the threshold to force an increase of 
CET1 will be 5.5%. It would be useful if the ECB would also consider a minimum ratio of risk 
bearing capital over total assets ratio of more than 3% (Basel rule), preferably in the range of 4.5 
to 6%. 
 
The ECB has no other choice than to produce credible results and to withstand the pressure by 
national supervisors (who want to keep their own credibility intact), by banks (who want to 
continue their existing business models without raising extra capital) and by national fiscal 
authorities (which are anxious to avoid that capital shortfalls are detected as they would have to, 
at least partially, fund them). Hiding problems once more, as was the case for the unfortunate 
previous EBA stress tests, is not an option any more as the credibility of the ECB and thereby the 
credibility of the euro is at stake. Likewise, we expect the ECB to insist on a credible and more 
severe one for certain eurozone member states than the one organised by the EBA for the 28 
member states. A credible stress test has proven to be important to return to solvent banks in the 
USA (IMF, 2013); the current stress tests by the FED will even put more pressure on the ECB 
and the EBA to come up with credible scenario’s. One can even assume that at least a few banks 
in the VEAPs will have to be found lacking capital to prove the credibility of the exercise while 
also the weakness of the business model of the German Landesbanken should be revealed. The 
CA can restore confidence in the banking industry, resulting in a proper functioning of the 
interbank market, restoring the monetary transmission mechanism and reducing the interest rate 
differentials which jeopardise investment and economic growth in the Southern member states. 
The Comprehensive Assessment  has the potential of becoming a “game changer” in the 
Eurocrisis. Its main force is already visible: banks are anticipating the outcome of the CA and 
started increasing their capital buffers, while governments and national supervisors also took 
action (e.g. in Italy). 
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3.2     The Single Resolution mechanism and bail-in 
 
The second pillar of the Banking Union is the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). It is 
important to understand that the SRM builds further upon the Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD), adopted by the Council end of June 2013 and planned to come into force at 
the beginning of 2015.  
The importance of the BRRD is frequently disregarded as the focus is on the problem of the 
missing fiscal backstop for the SRM. The main resolution measure is however, the automatic bail-
in which is inscribed into the BRRD. This controversial measure was first applied at the time of the 
Cyprus banking crisis while it was fiercely rejected by the ECB shortly before in the context of the 
Irish banking crisis. The bail-in instrument enables resolution authorities to write down or convert 
into equity the claims of the shareholders and creditors of institutions, which are failing or likely to 
fail (so-called "going concern" as compared to "gone concern" or failed bank). The ranking order 
of bail-in is crucial: first of all ordinary unsecured, non-preferred creditors are bailed in, like 
shareholders, bondholders and deposits from large corporations. Only if that is insufficient, the 
resolution authority can bail-in deposits from natural persons and SME’s; these have preference 
over the claims of the previous creditors. Deposits up to 100,000 euro are protected by the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme (see below) and are not bailed in; these are called “covered deposits”. Certain 
types of other liabilities are also permanently excluded, such as covered bonds, liabilities to 
employees, liabilities arising from a participation in payment systems and certain interbank 
liabilities. The BRRD states that bail-in should at least absorb losses amounting to 8% of the 
liabilities of a bank. That amounts to some 2500 bn euro, which is more than the capital and 
reserves of the eurozone MFI's balance sheet (2400 bn euro). This is much more than the 55 bn 
euro the Single Resolution Fund will dispose of in eight years time (see below). 
  
To solve cases when the bail-in is insufficient, member states have to set up ex-ante resolution 
funds, which need to reach within 10 years at least 1% of covered deposits of all credit institutions 
in the country. Financial institutions have to pay into these funds via contributions based on their 
liabilities, excluding own funds and covered deposits, and adjusted for risk.  
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The EC's new State aid rules applicable to support measures for banks in the context of the 
financial crisis (August 2013) mirror the provisions in the BRRD. They stipulate that equity and 
sub-ordinated bondholders must definitively be wiped out before any state assistance can be 
considered. EU state aid control thus effectively constitutes the basis for bank resolution well 
before the BRRD and the SRM take effect (Deutsche Bank, 2013). There is a heated debate about 
the bail-in with arguments for and against. However looking at the case of Cyprus, where it 
resulted in capital controls, one needs to treat this instrument cautiously.  
 
The Single Resolution Mechanisms includes two institutions: a Single Resolution Board and a 
Single Resolution Fund. The European Commission presented its proposal on 10 July 2013 and 
the Council adopted a general approach in December 2013. 
 
(1) The Single Resolution Authority (SRA) is based on article 114 TFEU. The decision making 
process is complex and involves several institutions. The Board consists of an executive director, 
four full-time appointed members and the representatives of the national resolution authorities of 
all the participating countries. It can meet in executive session, including only the director, the 
four full-time members and the representatives of member states concerned by a particular 
resolution decision.  The ECB/SSM starts the resolution process via a notification to the Board 
that a bank is failing or likely to fail or the Board can decide itself placing a bank into resolution. 
It then decides the application of resolution tools and the use of the single resolution fund. 
Decisions by the Board would enter into force within 24 hours of their adoption, unless the 
Council objects. Most draft resolution decisions are prepared in the executive session. The 
plenary session is responsible for decisions that involve liquidity support exceeding 20% of the 
capital paid into the fund, or other forms of support, such as bank recapitalisations.  If the 
European Commission disagrees with the Board, it has to go to the Council. Under pressure from 
the European Parliament, the too cumbersome  decision-making process (see Lorenzo Bin 
Smaghi, 2013) proposed by the Council has been streamlined and the role of the EC has been 
strengthened.  
 
(2) A Single Resolution Fund (SRF) is set up under the control of the SRA to ensure the 
availability of medium-term funding support while the bank is restructured. It needed to be based 
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on an Intergovernmental Agreement, because Nordic countries were afraid that such fund could 
impact their budgetary sovereignty, which would breach the Treaty ‘no-bail-out’ clause. During 
the first eight years, a network of national resolution funds will operate including the possibility 
to lend from each other on a voluntary basis; there will be no real common fund from the start, 
but rather a mechanism whereby the national resolution funds are gradually merged. All bail-in 
tools of the BRRD first need to be exhausted before the SRF can be tapped; it is the last line of 
defence before the ESM is used as a fiscal backstop but in a currently agreed manner, namely via 
national budgets. After eight years, a common SRF will be in place, which presumably will have 
a credit line to the ESM or the capital markets. 
 
The SRF is based on an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA), although three legal services (of 
the EC, the Council and the ECB) argued that article 114 TFEU was sufficient legal basis, but 
Germany vetoed this legal approach. An IGA runs counter to the Community method, it adds to 
the complexity of the EU decision making and it sidelines the European Parliament. 
A ten years period to mutualise a (rather small) resolution fund as proposed by the Council has 
been shortened to 8 years and the mutualisation is regressive over time, which is an important 
victory of the EP. The same applies to the possibility of the SRF to borrow. However, the latter 
possibility can backfire, because it can work procyclical. Indeed, when banks run into problems 
and need to be rescued by the SRF, they are most in need to raise extra capital, but the SRF will 
compete at the capital markets and burden the already weakened banks by an extra implicit 
liability, namely the duty to pay the loans back to the SRF (albeit within a certain limit). 
 
This complex system of decision making, based on a future network of national resolution funds 
cannot be called the key stone of the Banking Union. It misses the effective SRA as proposed by 
the EC and requires a true fiscal backstop. Such system exists in the USA, where the FDIC 
decides with a board of five independent experts and has a credit line of 100 bn USD to the 
Treasury, a credit line which is extended in times of crisis. For the eurozone, the available 
lending margin of the ESM (440bn euro) can be used to support governments in case they have 
to recapitalise banks and are not able to do so. However, this approach does not cut the “doomed 
loop” between banks and sovereigns, because the ESM provides for loans and these are added to 
the sovereign debt. It is irrelevant in this respect whether Eurostat excludes these from the 
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Maastricht debt or not as the financial markets will always consider it as government debt in an 
economic sense. It is recommended to give the SRF a credit line to the ESM. In this case, we 
would defend to stop the, much debated, direct recap, whereby the ESM can invest directly in 
problem banks for a maximum of 60 bn euro, but very conditional and in the very last instance, 
when all other channels of support for a bank have been exhausted. This direct bank recap runs 
indeed counter to the principle that the taxpayer should not pay for losses of banks.  
 
3.3  The Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
 
The political energy invested in the Banking Union and the short memory of politicians, helped by 
the fact that the ECB has temporarily calmed down the financial markets with its OMTs, explains 
that the lessons of the financial crisis are already forgotten and the required actions to finish the 
Banking Union are timid. The third pillar of the Banking Union, a Single Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme is not anymore on the agenda of the EU. Only an agreement on a coordinated Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme has been reached end 2013, repeating the existing national guarantee of at least 
100,000 euro and adding the requirement of setting up a prefinanced fund of at least 0.8% of the 
covered deposits. The missing link is the common guarantee fund. If an important bank would 
collapse, the national prefunded deposit guarantee fund will quickly prove insufficient, thereby 
forcing the national government to rescue the failing bank and risking setting in motion the 
"doomed loop". What is needed is a gradual risk sharing by mutualising national deposit guarantee 
funds, merging them with the SRF and giving the SRF a credit line to the ESM, as argued above.  
 
 
 
4   Conclusions 
 
It is clear that the establishment of the Euro is not an end in itself and that the EMU needs to be 
expanded in order to function well. Given that fiscal and economic pillars are currently not 
further developed, the Banking Union seems the only available instrument at our disposal. A  
true Banking Union is not only a quick fix but a genuine game changer. In a situation where 
labour is not mobile and trade of goods is relatively small, capital flows play a major role in 
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stabilizing or destabilizing the EMU.  Therefore a true Banking Union could not only solve the 
doomed loop between intertwined banks and sovereigns, it could also strengthen the EMU by 
facilitating effective shock stabilisers via the financial system, which normally absorbs 2/3 of all 
shocks in a well-functioning currency union. Building a genuine Banking Union will not be easy 
as there are banks and sovereigns that prefer to continue business as usual. However, as the US 
example shows, without a real public backstop or efficient resolution authorities, there cannot be 
a real Banking Union. Therefore, one should learn the lesson of the eurocrisis and come up with 
a truly centralized and efficient Single Resolution Authority that acts in a real European way and 
is able to resolve banks quickly. Additionally, we need a public backstop to assure markets that 
Europeans are serious about honouring their commitments and that the euro is based on solid 
foundations. Once all this is in place, there will be less need for a Eurozone budget or any other 
type of fiscal mutualism that is politically so difficult to achieve in Europe today. Given that 
there is no will for a political union, one has to take into account that beyond the Banking Union 
there are no other options to stabilise the EMU. We therefore reinforce the vision that a monetary 
union needs a banking union. 
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